The hottest emissions trading Taiyuan first

Emissions trading Taiyuan first

use emissions trading instead of government fees, so that pollution control can be changed from the mandatory behavior of the government to the independent market behavior of enterprises, but can this Taiyuan pilot with the direct goal of system construction be widely implemented

from the domestic situation, it has not yet appeared that the trading of emission rights has been concretized into an operational institutional arrangement and implemented. The "sulfur dioxide emissions trading system" funded by the Asian Development Bank has been piloted in 26 enterprises in Taiyuan, Shanxi Province since September. This is the first domestic emissions trading, and its significance and role are worth writing a special book

according to the theory of Pigou, a welfare economist, and commans, an old system economist, all fields with external problems need to be solved by the government. The traditional system of collecting sewage charges by the government is an example of this theory in practice. At present, there are many laboratory projects under research, including all solid-state batteries. The new institutional economics lays a theoretical foundation for replacing government fees with emissions trading. Its basic starting point is that pollution and being polluted have an "interactive nature", that is, banning pollution will also produce social costs. The key to the problem lies in how to reduce the social cost of prohibiting pollution and achieve the effective allocation of resources

according to Coase theorem, the reason why the trading of pollution rights can achieve the optimal allocation of resources is that no matter what the initial allocation of rights is, as long as the trading can be carried out freely, the wrong allocation can be corrected, provided that the transaction cost is zero; When the transaction cost is positive, as long as the market transaction can be carried out, the resource allocation will also be improved

the institutional arrangement for the government to collect pollution charges is a non market-oriented quota transaction. One party of the transaction is the enterprise, and the other party is the mandatory government. Under this institutional arrangement, the government has always been in an active position in formulating emission standards and imposing pollution charges, but it is not the main body of pollution discharge and treatment; Although enterprises are the main body of pollution discharge and control, they are in a passive position. As long as they meet the pollution discharge standards set by the government, there is no incentive to further control pollution and reduce the discharge of pollutants

unlike the government's collection of emission fees, the emission trading system can enable enterprises to truly become the main body of emission and pollution control, and make choices about their own pollution emission behaviors. Because under this kind of institutional arrangement, the government not only gave up some rights of quota trading, partially withdrew from the trading process, but also gave up the trading benefits obtained from it. At the same time, enterprises have obtained the benefits of emissions trading, and have a great incentive to actively participate in pollution control and emissions trading. Pollution control has changed from a mandatory behavior of the government to an independent market behavior of enterprises, and its transaction has also changed from an intergovernmental transaction to a real market transaction

as the cost of exceeding the standard emissions includes emissions charges, fines and other costs, as long as it is not only greater than emissions charges, but also greater than treatment fees, and to a certain extent, the total foreign investment of China's chemical industry in 2016 will reach 88billion yuan, enough to generate suppliers and demanders of emissions trading, forming a market for emissions trading. Because if the treatment fee is higher than the treatment fee, enterprises will be encouraged to carry out pollution treatment. Once the treatment results reach below the emission standard, enterprises will have emission rights that can be sold, so there will be suppliers of emission rights trading. At the same time, enterprises that cannot meet the emission standards for pollution control become the demanders of emission trading. In this way, the market system of emission trading has been formed. Through the bargaining between the supply and demand sides, the market equilibrium price of emission rights will also be formed

it should be noted that emissions trading is also in the experimental stage in developed countries. There is still a big gap between China's market and institutional conditions and those of developed countries. Whether the experiment in Taiyuan, Shanxi Province can be successful or not needs further observation. It also requires experimenters to conduct in-depth research, careful design and careful implementation

however, there is no doubt that the ADB's financing of the "sulfur dioxide emissions trading system" provides us with two important inspirations:

in a certain sense, the existence and function of the government is to solve external problems, but the inverse proposition of this proposition is not tenable, that is, not all external problems can only be solved by the government. Through certain institutional arrangements, externalities can be internalized, from government quota transactions to market transactions between enterprises (including individuals)

ADB, world bank and other international organizations have provided some loans and subsidies to China and some developing countries, which have played an important role in the economic and social development of these countries. However, the funding direction of the loan and the choice of projects are worthy of careful study. The author believes that the main role of these loans and subsidies is not to help these countries solve their financial difficulties, but to establish an effective system and rules to ensure that the experimental machine will not be overloaded and damaged

for example, the ADB loan to help build the Sanmao railway not only solved the financial difficulties of the construction, but also broke the state monopoly pattern of China's railway construction, creating a new model of joint venture railway construction

the world bank loan helped to build Lubuge Hydropower Station, which not only accelerated the construction of the power station, but also introduced the owner system, bidding system and supervision system of engineering construction for China. Since then, this system has taken root, sprouted, grown and expanded on the land of China. On May 13, Eastern time, it has become the basic system of China's construction industry management

now, the ADB loans and grants to Shanxi Province to carry out the pilot of the "sulfur dioxide emissions trading system", which takes the system construction as the direct goal. Such loan and funding project selection may be the most effective, and its effect will not be limited to a project, but will have an extremely wide range of influence and role